

Gwinnett County – Elections Audit Report

Audit 2009-007

May 5, 2009

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Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

As part of our 2009 audit schedule based on our risk assessment process, the Performance Management Division of Gwinnett County Government performed an efficiency and controls review of the Gwinnett County Elections Division activities. The objective of the review is to determine the adequacy of Gwinnett County Elections Division policies, procedures and internal controls; including oversight and monitoring as well as whether the policies, procedures and internal controls have been implemented and are working effectively.

OBSERVATIONS

The Performance Analysis Division examined the following Elections Division operational areas:

Budget, Income and Expenses	Voting Equipment Software
Production Analysis	Voting Ballots
Financial Disclosure	Policies & Procedures
Inventory	Electoral Register & Registration Process
Voting Equipment Contract Review	Absentee Balloting
Voting Equipment Maintenance, Repair & Warranty	Security, Backups & Access Controls
Training	Application & Appointment Process of Polling Staff

The Performance Analysis Division noted a number of opportunities for operational improvement. A few of those opportunities include:

- Establishing Gwinnett County specific formal comprehensive written policies and procedures as well as employee training manuals for critical Election Office functions.
- Instituting proper separation of duties to provide internal control so that one individual does not have control over more than one part of an Elections Division operational process.
- Examining and potentially reorganizing current staffing resources in order to successfully manage various labor intensive tasks.

To better match existing staffing resources to needs, the Performance Analysis Division recommends that the Elections Division:

- Cross-training workers on multiple functions so that they can step into tasks where demand is heavy and cover breaks.
- Implement shift work during election periods to prevent fatigue, reduce error, and keep essential work processes moving.
- Create skill redundancy for critical functions.

CONCLUSION

In our opinion, we found the operational procedures adequate to meet state requirements which ensure the accuracy of election results for the period under audit. However, we have identified opportunities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of certain operating procedures as discussed in the detail sections of this audit report.

Detailed Report

BACKGROUND

As part of our 2009 audit schedule based on our risk assessment process, the Performance Management Division of Gwinnett County Government performed an efficiency and controls review of the Gwinnett County Elections Division activities. The objective of the review is to determine the adequacy of Gwinnett County Elections Division policies, procedures and internal controls; including oversight and monitoring as well as whether the policies, procedures and internal controls have been implemented and are working effectively.

The Gwinnett County Board of Registration and Elections was created under Title 21, Chapter 2 of the O.C.G.A. as the official Board of Elections for Gwinnett County. The Board of Elections has jurisdiction over the conduct of primaries and elections and the registration of electors in Gwinnett County. The Board is composed of five members selected by appointment, each of whom shall be both an elector and a resident of Gwinnett County. The members are appointed as follows: two by the Gwinnett County Democratic Party; two by the Gwinnett County Republican Party; the fifth member is appointed by the other four appointees. The Board is also responsible for the appointment of the Elections Supervisor who supervises the day to day affairs of the Voter Registration and Elections Division. Officers shall be elected by the members of the Board by majority vote and shall serve a term of two years or until their successor is elected and qualified. These officers shall perform the duties prescribed by these rules and by the parliamentary authority adopted by the Board. The Officers of the Board shall be a Chairman, who shall also be the Chief Registrar and a Vice Chairman. The Board shall collectively serve as the Election Superintendent. The Chairman shall be entitled to make or second motions or nominations.

Kennesaw State University (KSU) has conducted certification tests of computer-based voting system for the State since 1988. Based on this expertise, the University proposed the formation of a center to support the installation and end-user training for the new voting system. The Secretary of State authorized KSU to create a Center for Election Systems, dedicated to assisting with the deployment of the DRE voting technology and providing ongoing support. The Center for Election Systems at Kennesaw State University (KSU) in Kennesaw, Georgia, was founded in April of 2002 for the purpose of supporting the Elections Division of the Office of the Secretary of State of Georgia in the statewide deployment of a uniform voting system. The Center was also charged with the responsibility of ensuring the integrity of voting systems in Georgia through training, research, auditing, and testing of voting systems. The Center maintains an arms-length working relationship with the Secretary of State and the vendor, ensuring both independence and objectivity in its work. The Center has continued to evolve, adapting to the emerging issues associated with elections in general and DRE technology in particular. This process is fully funded through a grant from the State of Georgia.

SCOPE AND APPROACH

The objective of the review is to determine the adequacy of Gwinnett County disbursement policies, procedures and internal controls and whether they have been implemented and are working effectively.

Our approach for this review included the following activities:

- Conducted interviews with the following Gwinnett County employees in order to better understand the accounting controls around the Gwinnett County elections process:
 - Lynn Ledford, Voter Registration and Elections Division Director
 - Susan Powell, Elections Associate II, Elections Division
 - Regina Clark, Elections Associate II, Elections Division
 - Lori Hackney, Temporary Associate, Elections Division
 - Lynn Hart, Administrative Support Associate III, Elections Division
 - Cecil Ash, Elections Associate II, Elections Division
- Obtained and reviewed Gwinnett County Elections Division written policies and procedures.
- Ensured that there is proper separation of duties within the Elections Division activities.
- Interviewed Elections Division employees in order to better understand the Elections Division operational controls.
- Reviewed and documented controls which ensure Elections Division activities are completed on schedule and within budget.
- Reviewed and documented flow of information between Elections Division and outside entities.
- Reviewed and documented flow of information within Elections Division office.
- Reviewed and documented Elections management reporting.
- Determined how the Elections Division checks the accuracy of department staff.
- Ensured compliance with regulatory processes.
- Verified internal controls exist and are adequate to effectively safeguard against abuse and errors.
- Determined if transactions were appropriately recorded and in accordance with applicable laws, rules, and regulations as specified.

OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Election Day Preparation and Election Day - Observations

The Performance Analysis Division did *not* perform the Elections Division audit during the course of the November 2008 General Election or during the period leading up to the November 2008 Election. The Performance Analysis Division was limited to some degree with respect to the audit tests and observations that could be completed due to the audit being performed approximately five months after the November 2008 Election. The audit performed was both an administrative audit designed to assess issues related to the efficiency of operational productivity and an operational audit designed to evaluate the internal control structure in a given process or area.

On Tuesday, April 14, 2009, the Performance Analysis Division interviewed Lynn Ledford regarding the 19,000 absentee ballots that had been sent to voters for the November 2008 General Election in which the ovals on the ballots were too thick for the optical scanner machine to read. Lynn Ledford explained that the reason this occurred was due to an Elections Division associate failing to select the correct printer drive *check box* in the Global Elections Management System (GEMS) server when creating the ballots. At the time it was not known to the Elections Division staff, the State of Georgia or Kennesaw State University that this particular incorrect printer driver was available on the GEM server.

The correct printer driver selected must match the printer used by the vendor to print the voter ballots. Lynn Ledford explained that at the time of the November 2008 General Election no preventive or detective control was put in place by the State of Georgia, Kennesaw State University or Gwinnett County that would have identified that the Elections Division associate had failed to select the correct printer driver *check box* on the GEM server prior to the voter ballots being sent to the vendor. The Elections Division has now established a procedure that requires a second Elections Division associate to verify that the correct database information is selected on the GEMS server prior to voter ballots being sent to the vendor. The printer driver selection is no longer an issue. Kennesaw State University has upgraded all GEMS servers throughout the State of Georgia and the need to select a printer driver has been eliminated.

It was noted during the July 2008 Election that all Gwinnett County precincts had reported and Gwinnett County election results continued to be posted for approximately 30% of the precincts. It was determined through conversation with Lynn Ledford that after approximately 70% of the 163 precincts had reported election results an Elections Division associate loaded all the absentee ballots to the GEMS server. Each precinct has results for both the absentee paper ballots, the absentee DRE ballots, and the polling place ballots. The GEMS software is unable to make a distinction in terms of what types of results have been reported when posting results totals; if a precinct has any type of results uploaded, it will be shown on the posted results as having reported even though the results may only represent one of the three types of results. Since the absentee ballots that were loaded to the GEM server represented all 163 precincts, it gave the appearance that all 163 precincts had reported their respective results in their entirety.

The result of this action was that the GEMS server reported that all 100% of the precincts in Gwinnett County had reported. The reality was that only approximately 70% of the precincts had reported and 100% of the precincts had reported absentee ballots due to the Elections Division associate prematurely loading the absentee ballots to the GEM server. The correct procedure is for the Elections Division associate to wait for all 163 (100%) of the precincts to report and then for the Elections Division associate is to load precinct 164 representing absentee ballots and precinct 165 representing provisional ballots to the GEMS server. Following the correct procedure would avoid the appearance of all 163 precincts reporting. Lynn Ledford explained that Kennesaw State University and Gwinnett County had not developed any written policies or procedures with respect to the order of precincts being loaded to the GEMS server, as this was a pilot project with the state.

Election Day Preparation and Election Day - Recommendations

The Elections Division needs to develop a comprehensive and up-to-date Gwinnett County specific Elections Day policy and procedure manual

The Elections Division needs to develop a Gwinnett County Elections Day employee training manual.

Voting Equipment Tabulates Ballots Accurately - Observations

On Wednesday, April 22, 2009, the Performance Analysis Division interviewed Regina Clark regarding the process of verifying that voting equipment tabulates ballots accurately prior to an Election. The Gwinnett County Elections Division creates the election database on the GEMS server and memory cards are created for each voting machine that will be assigned to each precinct. The number of voting units assigned to each precinct is determined by the number of registered voters and predicted turnout. The Board of Registration and Elections, which is made up of two Democrats, two Republicans and one non-partisan member, will review, sign and approve the Elections Summary Reports for all voting machines. The requirement is that a minimum of three Election Board members sign and approves each Election Summary Report. The Board of Registration and Elections verification process for both the Touch Screen and Optical scanner voting machines takes place in advance of actual Election Day as mandated by O.C.G.A. 21-2-383(a) (1) (“...45 days prior to any general primary or general election...”; this does not cover runoff primaries or elections as the “turn around” time for those events call for a shorter timeframe.)

The process of verifying that the voting equipment tabulates ballots accurately includes the following steps:

1. Logic and accuracy votes recorded on memory card.
2. Logic and accuracy results are uploaded to the GEMS server.
3. Election Summary Reports are printed for each memory card uploaded.
4. Election Summary Reports are sorted by vote type (polling location, absentee touch screen, or absentee optical scanner).
5. Elections Division presents to the Board of Registration and Elections and explains expected sequence.
6. The Board of Registration and Elections reviews every Election Summary Report.
7. The Board of Registration and Elections verifies that the Election Summary Report results are correct.
8. The Board of Registration and Elections signs the Election Summary Report verifying that the equipment tabulated ballots accurately during testing.
9. The original Election Summary Reports are prepared for storage in Records Management.

The Performance Analysis Division requested that the Elections Division obtain from Records Management all the original Elections Summary Reports for the November 2008 General Election. On Wednesday, April 22, 2009 the Performance Analysis Division reviewed all the original Election Summary Reports which the Elections Board signed and approved verifying the voting machines tabulated the ballots accurately.

The Performance Analysis Division noted an exception on the Optical scan voting machine Election Summary Report for precinct number nineteen (19). It was determined through review of the Election Summary Report that the voting on the test ballot was not processed correctly for the second position. A ballot card for the U.S Senate race and the District Attorney race were not coded correctly in the test deck of ballots. However, the Optical scan voting machine was tabulating ballots correctly. The Elections Division did not have the copy that was corrected. The Board of Registration and Elections *did not* sign and approve the Election Summary Report which recorded the incorrectly coded ballots.

The Performance Analysis Division noted an exception on the Optical scan voting machine Election Summary Report for precinct number thirty (30). It was determined through review of the Election Summary Report that the voting on the test ballot was not processed correctly for the second position. A ballot card for the “Court of Appeals – Ruffin” race was not coded correctly in the test deck of ballots. However, the Optical scan voting machine was tabulating ballots correctly. All five members of the Board of Registration and Elections *did* sign and approve the Elections Summary Report which recorded the incorrectly coded ballots.

Voting Equipment Tabulates Ballots Accurately - Recommendations

The Elections Division should assign only permanent Elections Division associates to verifying Election Summary Report results and to check test ballots before the ballots are used to test voting machines.

The Elections Division must manually verify all Elections Summary Reports are accurate after the Board of Registration and Elections has signed and approved the Election Summary Reports.

Absentee Voting Procedures - Observations

The Performance Analysis Division interviewed Lori Hackney and Lynn Ledford on Tuesday, April 21, 2009 to discuss the procedures for absentee voting. Gwinnett County Elections Division developed a written absentee voting manual in 2008. The manual mirrors the Georgia Election Code. The absentee voting manual covers the three categories of absentee voting which include “early voting; advanced voting and absentee voting by mail.”

Voters who decide not to cast their ballot at their regular polling place on the day of an election may cast their vote by absentee ballot. To receive an absentee ballot by mail, voters must complete a request for a ballot. This can be a formal application or a written request with specific voter information. The request is then submitted to the Gwinnett County Elections Division by mail, email or in person. The application is received and the date received is stamped on the application and maintained in a dated bin for additional processing. The application is checked for complete information including signature verification. If the application is accepted the date received is entered into the State Subsystem and the ballot style sent is determined by the voter’s precinct and district combination.

The Elections Division has forty eight (48) hours after receiving the application to accept it and submit a ballot by mail to the voter. The voter completes the ballot and returns the

ballot to the Elections Division within the time frame specified by law for the election which the vote pertains. Once the Elections Division receives the ballot from the voter it is processed to verify by signature verification that the returned ballot has been submitted by the voter that requested it. The signature on the ballot is matched to the application and the voter registration signature. The ballots are then delivered to the warehouse in the Elections Division and sorted according to precinct. The ballots are placed into cabinets protected with digilocks. The ballots are stored in cabinets until tabulation begins.

Absentee voting includes voting in person at the Elections Division or a satellite location within the county. The voter must first complete a "vote in office application" and complete the oath then sign the application. The voter's identification is checked and is approved by the Elections Division clerk by recording their initials on the application. The voter is then provided with an electronic ballot card and directed to the voting unit. The voting units in the Elections Division and satellite locations are locked following each day's voting.

The Performance Analysis Division noted through conversation with Lynn Ledford on Tuesday, April 21, 2009, that in 2008, the Elections Division began receiving complaints from voters regarding the delivery time of their absentee ballots from this office.

Several voters provided copies or returned the outer mailing envelope so that both the postmark dates and Elections Division processing dates could be investigated. The Elections Division met with mail room staff and provided support documents; however, the Elections Division did not maintain the support documents provided by the voters after that initial meeting.

According to Lynn Ledford an initial review showed there was a delay of approximately two days on some items from the date the ballot packet was picked up by the county mail room workers until the date postage was affixed and the ballot mailed. In several cases, the postage affixed was a higher amount than necessary.

Mail Services has a 3:00 pm deadline for all mail to be presented for metering and prepared to be picked up by the USPS. However, the mail services area has always been able to meter and prepare all mail that comes in each day. Last year, not only did Mail Services pick up mail from Elections, Elections also brought mail to Mail Services to be processed.

Mail Services stated to the Performance Analysis Division *"that in June 2008, it was noted that a large volume of mail was brought in by Janice Williams. Lisa called Elections and spoke with Jerry to ask if it was possible to finish up what they had on Monday. Jerry said that it was alright to finish on Monday. In November, Mail Services made numerous trips throughout the day to pick up ballots to be processed."*

Mail Services stated to the Performance Analysis Division *"it is possible that postage affixed to the ballots would be different. Ballots going thru our vendor would be processed at a lower rate (pre-sort). If the ballots were going directly to the Post Office, it would be standard rate. Also, if Elections sent Federal Express return envelopes inside any ballots, that would create a weight change and a higher postage."*

Further discussion revealed that the county utilizes a third-party vendor, Dove Mailing, for processing the county's outgoing mail. Dove Mailing is a qualified company the USPS recognizes to accept mail. There is a USPS postal clerk on sight that clears all mail going through this facility. Dove also handles Gwinnett County's Tax Commissioners mailing for property taxes. In addition to Gwinnett County, Dove handles political mailing for many politicians in Georgia and government mail for Cobb County, Clayton County, Hall County and other counties within Georgia. The same rules and restrictions the State Election Board has for mailings also pertains to political mailings and Tax Commissioners mailings for property taxes and tags. By using Dove, the County benefits by lower postage rates (pre-sort rates). Pre-sort mail actually enters the mail stream one (1) full day earlier, than mail picked up by the Post Office.

There are many variables that effect mail.

- Elections may not have brought over all the mail.
- Mail brought over too late to be processed that day.
- Bad addresses will delay mail delivery.
- Majority of mail is delivered within 72 hours; however, the USPS does not guarantee delivery.

According to the Election Division's personnel, the same situation continued through the November General Election. However, for the December runoff election, the Elections Division worked with mail room personnel and changed the delivery method. The mail room staff picked up the mail periodically throughout the day, affixed postage, and the ballots were taken directly to the United States Postal Service (U.S.P.S.) by county mail room staff. Voters received ballots within twenty-four (24) hours in most cases.

The combination of these issues experienced during the general election appears to create a need to change the delivery method of the absentee ballots.

Absentee Voting Procedures - Recommendations

The Performance Analysis Division recommends beginning with the July 2010 election the Elections Division examine the benefits of handling absentee ballots in one of two ways:

1. *The Elections Division transfers boxes of ballot envelopes to the mail room and have postage affixed, thereby allowing Elections Division staff to pack and take ballots directly to the U.S.P.S. either periodically when volume is high and once daily for low volume; or*
2. *The Elections Division transfers the ballot packets directly to the mail room, wait for mail room staff to affix postage and then take the ballots to the U.S.P.S.*

Both options will require the continued cooperation and coordination with the Gwinnett County mail room.

This new procedure will ensure Gwinnett County compliance with applicable laws and rules regarding timely delivery of absentee ballots.

Voting Software Installed is Certified and Correct - Observations

The Performance Analysis Division met with Lynn Ledford on Thursday, April 23, 2009 to discuss voting machine software. The Elections Division does not currently have a comprehensive and up-to-date Gwinnett County specific policy and procedure manual designed to ensure that all updates to voting equipment software are current and complete. Lynn Ledford explained that all voting machine software is installed and certified by Kennesaw State University. Voting machines that are sent to Premier for repair must be recertified by Kennesaw State prior to being returned to active inventory. Voting equipment sent to Premier for repair is forwarded to Kennesaw State University to be recertified and returned to Gwinnett County Elections Division. When Gwinnett County purchases a large quantity of voting equipment from Premier, Kennesaw State University will come to the Gwinnett County Elections Division to certify the voting equipment prior to being placed into service.

The Performance Analysis Division interviewed Janice Williams on Monday, April 27, 2009, and verified through conversation that new voting equipment shipped directly to the Elections Division is not returned to active service until Kennesaw State University can re-certify the equipment. This explains the long time period between ship dates and the acknowledgement date of receipt. The Elections Division will not acknowledge receipt of the voting equipment until recertification has occurred.

The Gwinnett County Elections Division maintains a visitation log that is used to document the Kennesaw State University employee's name servicing the voting equipment software or voting machine and the date they were at the Elections Division. The log *does not* document what service was performed during the visit. Kennesaw State University does not always provide to the Elections Division written documentation of each visit and what service was performed. When Kennesaw State University updates the voting machines each machine is tagged with a certification certificate by Kennesaw State University upon completion of any update and the machine is then secured.

Voting Software Installed is Certified and Correct - Recommendations

The Elections Division needs to develop a comprehensive and up-to-date Gwinnett County specific policy and procedure manual to ensure that all updates to software are current and completed.

The Elections Division should create a Gwinnett County voting equipment tracking form documenting the Kennesaw State University employee's name, visitation date, and specific work performed on voting machines as well as documenting voting equipment out for repair.

Voting Equipment Contract Review - Observations

The Performance Analysis Division met with Lynn Hart to discuss contracts and/or agreements that the Elections Division has with third parties.

Performance Analysis has received and reviewed the following warranty agreements:

- Hardware Extended Warranty Agreement with Premier Election Solutions effective January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009 covering 333 ExpressPoll units and 1,587 AccuVote units
- Software License, Software Maintenance and Hardware Warranty Agreement with Diebold Election Systems dated 08/03/07, which was returned by the County unsigned. Diebold had changed their name to Premier Election Solutions and the County wanted the warranty agreement to reflect the new company name.

Other documents provided:

- Intergovernmental Agreement and the First Amendment to the Intergovernmental Agreement dated 11/01/05, which outlines the terms and conditions under which the State furnishes electronic voting machines to the County
- Inventory Listings of State and County owned ExpressPoll units
- Provision and Support of an Online Training System for Precinct Officers

All contracts and agreements are in order and reflect the current year except for the Software License and Maintenance Agreement.

An agreement covering Software License, Software Maintenance and Hardware Warranty was sent from Diebold Election Systems to Gwinnett County in August 2007 for the period beginning January 1, 2008. This particular agreement covered the software license and maintenance for 331 ExpressPoll units and the annual extended hardware warranty for the same 331 ExpressPoll units.

This agreement was returned by the Department of Support Services unsigned, requesting that a new contract be issued with the company's new name (Premier Election Solutions). When Premier returned the agreement with the new company name (Premier) it only included the Extended Hardware Warranty Agreement. There is no indication that this agreement has ever been updated or renewed.

The cost to renew the software agreement for 2008 would have been \$8,275 for the 331 ExpressPoll units. According to the Purchasing Department this is below their threshold for pursuing a contract and it is up to the user department process. Also, Section 4.2 of the Intergovernmental Agreement between the Secretary of State and Gwinnett County indicates that it is the County's responsibility to obtain voting equipment maintenance, warranty coverage and technical support.

Voting Equipment Contract Review - Recommendation

The Elections Division must make a determination if software warranty for voting equipment is necessary and, if so, contact the vendor and have the Software License and Maintenance Agreement issued and brought up-to-date.

Elections Division Budget, Income and Expense Controls - Observations

On Friday, April 17, 2009, the Performance Analysis Division interviewed Lynn Ledford regarding the Elections Division budget, as well as controls over expenditures and income. The 2008 adopted Elections Division Election budget was \$4,786,598 of which

\$3,913,035 (82%) was spent. The 2008 adopted Elections Division Administrative budget was \$1,260,936 of which \$1,190,214 (96%) was spent. The Elections Division does not have a 2009 Election budget due to 2009 being an off election year. The 2009 adopted Elections Division Administrative budget is \$1,160,927.

The Department of Community Services requires that a "Request for Payment" form be completed for all Elections Division purchases. Lynn Ledford, Elections Division Director signs the "Request for Payment" form approving purchases. The Elections Division purchases supplies through one of the following processes:

- Bid Process – (Sealed or unsealed)
- Shopping Cart
- Procurement Card

In 2008, the Elections Division had only one procurement card which was assigned to Lynn Ledford. Fourteen (14) transactions totaling \$1,957.47 were processed on the procurement card in 2008. The Performance Analysis Division conducted an audit of the procurement card transactions for 2008 and noted no exceptions.

In 2009, the Elections Division has four (4) procurement cards which are assigned to the following Elections Division associates:

- Lynn Ledford
- Regina Clark
- Janice Williams
- Lynn Hart

As of April 17, 2009, Lynn Hart's procurement card is the only card with activity. Lynn Hart's procurement card had nineteen (19) transactions totaling \$2,120.83. The Performance Analysis Division conducted an audit of the procurement card transactions for 2009 and noted no exceptions.

The Elections Division obtains income in the form of cash, checks or money orders for copies or CDs of the following items:

- Voter lists
- Campaign disclosure documents
- Financial disclosure documents
- Election result documents
- Qualifying fees

The Performance Analysis Division performed a walk through of the cash handling procedures on Friday, April 17, 2009 at the Elections Division. The Elections Division maintains cash in a combination locked box in an unlocked file drawer in the Reception Office. The Elections Division does not have written cash handling policies and procedures and has not formally established separation of duties with respect to cash collection. The Elections Division maintains a numerically sequenced receipt book; checks are made out to the Board of Commissioners.

Elections Division Budget, Income and Expense Controls - Recommendations

The Elections Division needs to establish formal written policies and procedures for cash collection.

The Elections Division should institute proper separation of duties to provide internal control so that one individual does not have control over more than one part of the cash collection process.

The following cash collection responsibilities should be segregated:

- *Cash collection*
- *Preparing bank deposit and bank deposit slip*
- *Reconciling receipts to activity log and funds collected*

The Department of Community Services should minimize the number of procurement cards assigned to the Elections Division.

Financial Disclosure - Observations

The Performance Analysis Division met with Lynn Hart on April 28, 2009, concerning financial disclosure reports. The Board of Elections for Gwinnett County abides by the State of Georgia rules and regulations for Financial Disclosure Statements for candidates, elected officials, and other organizations that are required by law to file the specified reports. The Elections Division is responsible for various types of financial reports. They are listed below:

- The Campaign Contribution Disclosure Report
- The Financial Disclosure Statement
- The Declaration of Intention.

Once the declaration of intent has been filed with the Elections Division, the potential candidate is put on a list to receive notification of when reports are due. The Elections Division notifies each candidate by mail when a form is due and supplies them with forms and instructions. The Elections Division has also made these forms available online for anyone who chooses to utilize this option. All forms must be completed by the candidate and returned to the Elections Division by a certain date with an original, notarized signature. All forms are checked for completion before the forms are accepted. Candidates that fail to file on a timely basis must be reported to the State of Georgia Ethics Commission who in turn issues fines accordingly. When candidate records are submitted and accepted they are considered public record. The Elections Division will make the records available through the Gwinnett County Website and copy records for a fee.

Financial Disclosure - Recommendations

The Elections Division should establish a formal Gwinnett County-specific written policy and procedure for Financial Disclosure of candidates.

A seminar or training session should be held for representatives of all political committees to attend regarding campaign finance laws and regulations and the reporting requirements for each committee. The training is conducted by the State of Georgia Ethics office.

Voter Registration - Observations

On Friday, April 3, 2009, the Performance Analysis Division interviewed Lynn Ledford and Susan Powell regarding the Gwinnett County elector register and voter registration process. Lynn Ledford and Susan Powell indicated that they do not currently have a comprehensive and up-to-date Gwinnett County voter registration policy and procedure manual. Without uniform, well-written, easy-to-understand procedures, it is impossible to adequately train temporary workers or guard against loss of knowledge when experienced workers leave.

Procedures that are current, accurate, and user-friendly are critical to every election office. Gwinnett County relies heavily on its temporary employees, because the small core of experienced full-time staff cannot monitor every task performed. Thus, it is imperative that temporary employees have access to detailed procedures to ensure that critical tasks are properly executed.

The Gwinnett County Elections Division has a policy and procedure manual dated 2003-2007, which the Elections Division plans to up date by December 2009. The State of Georgia voter registration user's manual for the statewide voter registration system was created in 1995. The State of Georgia voter registration manual was revised in 2000 and is currently being revised again. The Gwinnett County Elections Division utilizes that users manual in addition to the State of Georgia rules and regulations for voter registration Chapter 183-1-6.03, 183-1-6.05, and 183-1-20.01 and O.C.G.A Title 21 Chapter 2 Article 6 "Registration of Voters."

Gwinnett County citizens who would like to register to vote must fill out a voter registration form and provide appropriate identification, when applicable. The voter registration forms are available on the Internet, in public libraries, city hall, and can also be picked up at the Elections Division Office. The voter's identification is checked to verify the voter's identity. The voter registration forms are submitted to the Gwinnett County Elections Division and entered into the state voter registration database. The signatures for these cards are scanned and kept as permanent records. The voter registration form (hard copy only) is maintained on file as long as the voter is eligible to vote within the county. The Elections Division is currently processing voter registration cards submitted in January 2009 through April 2009. The Elections Division is approximately four months behind in processing voter registration forms. The processing of voter registration forms is accomplished with Gwinnett County employees and temporary staff. The State of Georgia is *not* responsible for ensuring a voter is eligible to vote when the voter submits a voter registration application. Once the voter's information is obtained it is compared with the Department of Driver Services and the Social Security Administration database for matches. If non-matches are identified, the County is notified by the State of Georgia in the form of a list in order to reconcile the reason for the discrepancy.

The Gwinnett County Elections Division receives reports from the State of Georgia on a daily basis. The reports are reviewed by the Elections Division in order to update the Electoral Register. The process of reviewing the reports is very labor intensive. The Elections Division needs to determine if discrepancies can be resolved quickly or if further steps to contact the voter by mail are required to clear up any questions or concerns. Susan Powell indicated that the office is now approximately one to two months behind in reviewing the reports for discrepancies. See *appendix A*.

The State of Georgia will automatically delete inactive voters. The function cannot be performed manually due to State of Georgia policies and procedures. For a voter to be classified as inactive the voter would have not voted in the last two General Elections.

The following is a list of reports the State of Georgia provides Gwinnett County Elections Division on a daily basis:

Felony Master	Listing of Possible Duplicate Voters
DDS Matching	Active Voters by Race/Gender within District Type
Non-Citizen Matching	Active Voters by Race/Gender
Master Daily Transaction Report	Inactive Voters by Race/Gender
Listing of Duplicate Social Security # Listing of Duplicate Driver License Number	Monthly DMV application numbers removed from

Voter Registration - Recommendations

The Elections Division needs to develop a comprehensive and up-to-date Gwinnett County specific voter registration policy and procedure manual.

The Elections Division needs to develop a Gwinnett County elections employee voter registration training manual.

The Elections Division needs to examine and potentially reorganize current staffing resources in order to successfully manage various labor intensive tasks.

To better match existing staffing resources to needs, the Elections Division should:

- *Cross-train workers on multiple functions so that they can step into tasks where demand is heavy and cover breaks.*
- *Implement shift work during election periods to prevent fatigue, reduce error, and keep essential work processes moving.*
- *Create skill redundancy for critical functions.*

Application and Appointment Process of Polling Staff - Observations

On April 16, 2009 the Performance Analysis Division interviewed Regina Clark regarding the application and appointment process of polling and Election Night staff. Regina Clark indicated that there are several levels of polling staff. The levels are as follows:

- Area Manager – Responsible for the managing several precincts and can take the place of a poll manager in an emergency.
- Poll Manager – Chief poll official at the polling place.
- Assistant Poll Manager – Experienced and trained to take over if Poll Manager is not available.
- Clerk - Workers within a precinct trained in all phases of the elections process.

The nomination and confirmation of election officials that serve on Election Day is a multi-step process. State of Georgia Code 21-2-92 outlines a precise process which includes the timeline for nomination and appointment; State of Georgia Code 21-2-99 covers the training of these officials. Gwinnett County maintains a Poll Official Data Base in which to recruit potential staff for the election process. The Elections Division also recruits potential candidates through the local newspapers, metro area realtors, colleges, Gwinnett County website, high schools, and churches, references from current and prior poll workers, office staff and voter registration forms. The Elections Division utilizes the list to update the database and create a list for each precinct poll manager. The poll manager will utilize the contact lists to identify potential candidates in their precinct to fill vacant positions.

All poll workers are required to receive training prior to each election. The critical training is obtained by an online process and additional training through a classroom setting. The training is conducted using materials produced by the Elections Division staff referenced from the Secretary of State's office. Records are on file at the Gwinnett County Elections Division providing evidence that each poll worker received the appropriate training and has taken an oath to become a poll worker.

Application and Appointment Process of Polling Staff - Recommendations

No exceptions noted.

Security and Access Controls to the Election Systems including System Back-up - Observations

Election Systems

On April 7, 2009 the Performance Analysis Division interviewed Lynn Ledford, Voter Registration and Elections Director, regarding Gwinnett County's security and access controls to the election process, including provisions for system backup. The Gwinnett County is in possession of three types of equipment:

- Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting units. These units are used for walk-in voting and utilize the touch screen voting method.
- Optical Scan Vote Tabulation system. This unit is used only for absentee ballots and provisional ballots.
- The Global Election Management System (GEMS) server is used to create the election database and for centralized tabulation of election results.

Security and testing of all voting machines, software, and programming used in the election process are essential to ensuring the accuracy of each election. Gwinnett County is governed by the State of Georgia rule Chapter 183-1-12.3 "*Tabulation Center Personnel, Trained and Certified*" concerning certification of all equipment. The rule states that all tabulating center personnel must be trained in the respective duties identified by section 183 and certified. The Gwinnett County Elections manager performs the training. The training and certification consists of an informal short class. Each attendee must sign a document indicating that they will not compromise the election equipment. The Gwinnett County Election Board reviews and approves diagnostic testing, calibration and automatic verification of election machines. A diagnostic tape (print-out) is obtained from each machine indicating the results of the test and the tapes are stored in Records Management. The diagnostic tape (print-out)

verifies that the voting machine tabulated correctly. If the voting machine is not tabulating correctly the voting machine will not be used in the election. The voting machine will be sent to Premier Election Systems for repair. The Elections equipment tally machines are certified by the State of Georgia.

Elections equipment security and access controls

The physical security of the GEMS server appears to be adequate; access to the room in which the GEMS server is located is restricted and only accessible to permanent Elections Division staff. Only two Elections Division team members have log on access to the GEMS server. The GEMS server is not currently backed up at an alternate location. However, a master copy of the database is burned to a CD and maintained on file in the Elections Division. The elections equipment maintained in the Elections Division warehouse area is covered, but is still potentially exposed to water damage if the water based fire suppression system were to go off due to a fire. The elections equipment in the Elections Division warehouse area is also vulnerable to potential theft due to weak physical security features. According to Lynn Ledford "it would cost Gwinnett County between \$5 million and \$10 million dollars to replace all the Elections equipment maintained in the Elections Division warehouse area."

It appears through observation and conversation with Elections Division staff that the security level within the Elections Division is minimal. The Elections Division does have a key entry system, but the number of keys is not limited. The Elections Division does maintain a key list, which is provided on a monthly basis by Facilities Management. The Elections Division does not currently appear to have an alarm system attached to each door of the building.

Lynn Ledford indicated during the interview that the Elections Division is currently developing an Information Technology Disaster Recovery Plan and a Business Disaster Recovery Plan. The Elections Division does not currently have the infrastructure in place to execute the plan.

Security and Access Controls to the Election Systems including System Back-up - Recommendations

The Elections Division needs to complete the development of the Information Technology Disaster Recovery Plan and Business Disaster Recovery Plan and develop appropriate infrastructure to execute the plan.

To safeguard the Elections equipment and the integrity of the election process, the Election Division should:

- Install an alarm system on all peripheral doors of Elections Division building.*
- Limiting entry to sensitive Elections Division areas to necessary personnel only.*
- Consideration be given to installing cameras and motion detectors in the warehouse*

We would like to see the county research an alternative method of fire suppression; this might include but is not limited to the FM-200 fire suppression system.

Ballot Preparation - Observations

On Thursday, April 9, 2009, the Performance Analysis Division interviewed Regina Clark regarding the printing, counting and securing of voter ballots. The Elections Division performs a number of complex tasks which begin long before Election Day in order to prepare for an election.

The following is a listing of the tasks that must be performed:

- Elections staff must receive all relevant information from candidates and jurisdictions to create the ballots.
- Arrange for printing of ballots; manage a system to serve overseas, absentee, and military voters.
- Program and test vote tallying equipment; update a file with all eligible voters who will receive ballots.
- Coordinate the process of addressing, inserting, and mailing ballots and oversee multiple vendor provided services.
- Elections must ensure that there is adequate physical security for the absentee ballot drop boxes, building, tally machines, and related computer equipment.

Ballot Preparation - Recommendations

The Elections Division needs to develop a Gwinnett County elections employee training manual for printing, counting and securing ballots.

Dividing Precincts - Observations

The Performance Analysis Division interviewed Cecil Ash on Tuesday, April 28, 2009, regarding dividing election precincts. The Elections Division has developed a procedure manual for dividing precincts. Cecil Ash is currently cross training an Election Office team member in the process of dividing precincts.

The Elections Division will determine the appropriate time to divide precincts by examining the voting equipment records and assess if the last voter at the close of voting on Election Day had to wait more than one hour to cast their vote. The following is the approval process for dividing precincts:

- Lynn Ledford, Director, Voter Registration and Elections
- Public Notice in Gwinnett Daily Post as the legal organ for Gwinnett County
- Board of Elections
- Board of Commissioners
- United States Department of Justice
- Copy filed with Attorney General

Monitoring and Scrutiny of Postal and Absentee Voting - Observations

On Wednesday, April 15, 2009, the Performance Analysis Division interviewed Lori Hackney regarding the monitoring and scrutiny of postal and absentee voting. Lori

Hackney explained that the Gwinnett County Elections Division has a written manual for Absentee Voting. The manual describes how the absentee voting process is performed. Lori Hackney indicated that Gwinnett County has three categories of absentee voting. The categories are as follows:

- *Early voting* which is conducted at the Elections Division and starts approximately 30 to 45 days prior to Election Day and runs through the Friday before Election Day. This includes both in person and by mail.
- *Advanced voting* which is conducted at satellite locations held one week prior to Election Day and is offered Monday through Friday prior to Election Day with the approval of the U.S. Department of Justice. This is in person voting only.
- *Absentee voting* by mail is the third category which is offered 30 to 45 days prior to Election Day.

Absentee voting in person at the Elections Division or at a satellite location is performed with direct recording electronic voting units. The voting units are loaded ballots for each precinct within the county. Once the voting units are loaded they are picked up and delivered to each satellite location. At the completion each day's voting the voting units are sealed. The seal is recorded for security purposes. Verification is conducted at the close of each day's voting to check the number of voters against the number of ballots cast.

Applications to receive ballots by mail (postal absentee) are received by the Elections Division and are verified through the voter's signature, name, address, date of birth, as well as the date the application is received and accepted into the State Sub System by the Elections Division. The ballot is then mailed out to the voter. Once the voters return the ballots to the Elections Division the process of counting each ballot begins on Election Day. The ballots are logged into the State Sub System so that each ballot has a received by date. The Elections Division will perform second signature verification on oath attached to ballot. Each ballot is then sorted by precinct and put into locked cabinets located in the warehouse of the elections facility until ballot counting begins. Absentee ballot tabulation is conducted using optical scan tabulation units.

Voting Equipment Maintenance, Repair Process and Warranty - Observations

All warranty and repair work is processed as set forth in the Hardware Extended Warranty Agreements from Premier Election Solutions. Extended Warranty is only available on Optical Scan, Touch Screen and ExpressPoll equipment. All repairs are covered except those caused by misuse, abuse or breakage caused by accidents, poll worker mistreatment or for improper use of equipment.

Examples of items covered under warranty (assuming no abuse or neglect)

- Inoperable motherboards
- Equipment that has stopped functioning without an obvious cause

Examples of items not covered under warranty include:

- Cracked Touch Screens
- Broken legs from improperly setting up units
- Cracked equipment from transporting or shipping
- Equipment that has fallen or been improperly stored

For both warranty and non-warranty work the County calls Premier's help desk and requests permission to return equipment for repair. Upon receipt of equipment, Premier schedules repair, completes the repair and returns equipment to the County. The major difference is the County has to pay for non-warranty repairs as well as freight charges.

When repair work is completed, Premier returns are sent to Kennesaw State University (KSU) for certification. Upon certification, Kennesaw State University ships the equipment to the Elections Division located on Grayson Highway.

Preventative maintenance is not included in Premier standard contracts or in any standard Extended Warranty Agreement. Separate agreements are needed for this service.

Voting Equipment Inventory - Observations

As part of the Elections Division review the Performance Analysis Division performed a review of those voting devices that are under warranty with Premier Election Solutions. The objective of the review was to determine all hardware equipment that should be covered by extended warranty is, indeed, covered.

Currently there are 333 ExpressPoll units, 1,576 touch screen units and 11 optical scan units under extended warranty agreement with Premier Election Solutions. We were able to trace all pieces of equipment that are listed on the Hardware Extended Warranty Agreements with Premier Election Solutions to the Elections Division's inventory records. No exceptions were noted.

In addition to comparing the number of units under warranty to inventory records we also performed a sheet to floor inventory on a sample basis. Our review included:

- 4 of 42 ExpressPoll 4000 units
- 5 of 160 ExpressPoll 5000 units
- 27 of 354 Touch Screen (TSX) Units
- 19 of 1,485 DRE's (there are 178 carts containing these units – our sample covered 2 carts)
- 19 of 19 Opti Scan units

All units sampled were in the warehouse location as stated on the inventory records. No exceptions were noted.

Voting Equipment Inventory - Recommendations

The Elections Division should establish formal Gwinnett County-specific written policy and procedures for maintaining voting equipment inventory.


The Election Office should bar code voting machines and machine cases in order to track the location of voting machines.

Production Analysis - Observations

Rate of Production

Improving productivity can be accomplished with two approaches. The “efficiency” approach does not require extra resources, and is defined as doing more with fewer or the same resources. The “effectivity” approach requires enhanced technology and critical processes to achieve the highest productivity for available resources.

As shown in the graph below, the Elections Division’s productivity per employee over a ten-year period (1999 - 2008) improved exponentially by 1176%. This has been accomplished through increased efficiency with specific focus on production, streamlined processes, revised regulations/procedures, and minor technological enhancements.




Exponential improvement in a high-volume production environment is usually attributable to major technological advancements, however, the improvements in the Elections Division are largely attributable to concentrated efforts to eliminate wasteful activity combined with increased individual production dependent on the experience level of employees in the division.

It is important to realize that exponential improvement in production does not always equate to exponential improvement in quality. It can reflect an organization that is simply increasing output through increase expended effort. Without further infusion of a combination of technology and radical process redesign the current trend in Elections is unsustainable without experiencing quality escapes.

Organizational Capacity


The sizable increase in production was further analyzed to better understand the impact on organizational resources. Based on historical demand, sustained production rates will present production challenges in 2009 and 2010.

As the two trend lines approach and cross in the graph below, the demand rate begins to outpace the “organization’s” rate of production. As with any substantial production improvement over a long period of time, the rate becomes unsustainable without modifying the level of resources, applied technology, or critical processes.




When the demand exceeds organizational capacity, unwanted queues build, errors increase, and the overall quality of work and the work environment deteriorates. Successful transactions become dependent upon costly quality assurance oversight and corrective action intervention.

In a high-volume production environment not supported with advanced automation, the operation is dependent on manual labor output. The number of permanent employees and long-term temporary employees in 2009 has been reduced to the 2002 level. While reducing personnel results in higher production per employee, this situation can present real production challenges to the organization.




The graph below demonstrates a large increase in transactions performed in contrast to a small increase in actual labor hours worked over the ten year period. Over the past ten years, there was an average year-over-year increase of 2.55% in labor hours. This is in contrast to a 49.5% increase year-over-year in per person production.



Production Demand


Total transactions required to service the population of registered voters has also grown exponentially over the past decade. To demonstrate this point, the total number of transactions to registered voters in 1999 was .32 transactions per voter. In contrast, the number of transactions per registered voter in 2008 was **2.96**.



This growth in transactions is attributable to many factors, such as the transient population moving to and from Gwinnett County; changing local, state, and federal regulations and practices, and population growth over the last ten years.

Routine activities have also intensified over the past decade. The contributing factors include increased regulatory implications affecting procedural processes; validation processes to ensure accuracy; complex technical equipment preparation, auditing, and testing; additional voter options requiring improved access; increased variety in voter documentation; increased diversity in the voter base; intensified training of election volunteers, and an aging volunteer base.

While 2009 represents a projected lower production demand on the organization during the off-election year. Preparation for the 2010 election, and clean-up from the 2008 election will still require over 1 million transactions to be processed.




Transaction volume is the primary driver affecting production demand, and without a complete redesign of major processes, aided by some automation, significant reductions in transaction volume is improbable.

Observations indicate the majority of activities are not designed to allow for continuous flow production or small batch production. The workflow is subjected to numerous capacity constraints in multiple processes that bottleneck production.

Diminished throughput is often experienced due to capacity constraints and process error conditions. Subsequently, a reduced flow of activity is experienced throughout the production line of activity, and this becomes the standard approach to production unless the root cause of error is eliminated, or significant additional labor is expended to meet demand.

Workforce Flexibility

An analysis of demand related to major activities was performed to project workload for 2009 and 2010. This analysis indicates that production demand will remain consistent with 2008 production demand. The organization is demonstrating considerable flexibility in personnel re-assignment to address the most urgent needs. Plans are already in place to shift the workforce to address anticipated shifts in demand.




2009 projections are based on current activity rates for categories shown on the graph to the left.

The actual volume of transactions will be consistent with 2007 which was slightly above 1,000,000 transactions.

A considerable shift in activity will occur in 2010 election year as shown in the graph to the right.

The major shift will be related to absentee activity processing. Special projects and cross-training will be discontinued in this time frame.



Operational Efficiency

Establishing optimal efficiency in the Elections Division is contingent on the organization's ability to implement continuous flow techniques for its major processes. Continuous flow is best defined as producing and moving an item through a series of processing steps as continuously as possible. Continuous flow techniques have minimal manual intervention and avoid long queues between different steps in the process flow.

The majority of the major processes deployed in the Elections Division, however, require creation of hardcopy documents; excessive handling; creation of queues, and inefficient bulk processing. Subsequently, considerable backlogs have accumulated in the operation.

Current backlogs and associated estimated labor hours required to eliminate the backlogs are shown below:

Backlog Description	Est. Labor Hours
100,000 deleted registration forms to be validated and then destroyed	1440 .7 FTE @ 1 yr
56,000 deleted registration forms (2007/2008) that require scanning, indexing, batching, and disposition to Records.	3733 1.79 FTEs @ 1 yr
18000 inactive, deleted registration forms that require verification, scanning, indexing, batching, and disposition to Records	1200 .58 FTE @ 1 yr
January 2009 – April 2009 new registration forms to be validated	3466 1.67 FTE @ 1 yr
Total Estimated Labor Hours	9839 4.74 FTEs @ 1 yr

This condition is somewhat problematic in that Elections will have dedicated an estimated 9800 labor hours in 2009, or 31% of available annual labor hours to eliminate this backlog. Backlogs in a high volume work environment create undesirable levels of Work in Process (WIP). This condition requires more manual intervention to validate the actual status of voter registration records, and ultimately to make the appropriate updates to same records.

The sequential dependency of production processes in Elections requires a backlog free environment to avoid a counterproductive effect where one unaccomplished task impacts a downstream requirement.

A more serious condition can result, however, where records are not updated in a timely manner which can result in potential violations of election rules. For example, if one registration update for a single voter is not accomplished before another update to the same voter record occurs, then subsequent updates to the voter record are out of sequence resulting in an unintended modification to the record.

Benchmarking


Benchmarking with the Cobb, Dekalb, and Forsyth Counties was performed using 2009 data to compare Election department resources. A comparison of total employees per 1000 voters is provided in the table below:

County	Full Time Perm	Temporary	Registered Voters	Employees per 1000 Registered Voters
Gwinnett	10	5	420512	.0357
Dekalb	14	1	455348	.0329
Forsyth	10	0	120456	.0830
Cobb	20	7	440315	.0613

There is no immediate conclusion from the data alone. Additional conversation with elections personnel from other counties suggests those with a higher percentage of employees per voter are not accumulating mid-cycle backlogs and are not operating under stress to meet upcoming deadlines. General conversation with Dekalb County indicated their organization was faced with similar productions challenges as Gwinnett County Elections Division.

Another important point is that the Election's director in Gwinnett is required to perform routine production tasks in order to maintain acceptable levels of operational output. Discussions with other counties did not reveal similar practices were being followed.

Gwinnett and Cobb County's Elections Divisions' organizational charts are shown below:



Recommendations

Recommendation 1:

Develop comprehensive value-stream mapping of critical functions to identify opportunities to eliminate waste (queues, capacity constraints, process variability, conveyance, defects, motion, under-utilization of resources, non-value added processing, and backlog).

Continuous flow is the central objective with this initiative. Major process redesign is needed to eliminate unnecessary document “touches” to establish and maintain voter records.

The voter registration process at the Libraries is introducing 5% to 7% error into the system due to the lack of quality control checks. This creates delayed WIP or backlog.

Recommendation 2:

Launch formal process improvement (Lean) initiative to accelerate and achieve dramatic improvements of all major activities.

Recommendation 3:

Evaluate automation solutions to eliminate hardcopy creation and processing. Automation solutions could enhance the voter registration process and internal processes. This is an expensive and longer-term solution, but should be a part of a larger efficiency analysis.

Recommendation 4:

Perform a comprehensive staffing analysis, including compensation, with the assistance of Human Resources. Compare the organization with other municipalities to ensure appropriate staffing levels and competitive compensation for the work being performed.

The organization is staffed with long-term temporary employees with 10+ year tenures. While these individuals are critical to the success of carrying out the organization’s mission, it is important to ensure county employees’ compensation is competitive with the compensation of temporary employees.

Recommendation 5:

Perform benchmarking initiative with other elections organizations to identify best-practices. This will require working with other organizations in the state and possibly across the nation to ensure diverse business process approaches are considered in the evaluation.

Recommendation 6:

Ensure adequate resource support is provided for Elections leadership to perform needed process improvement analysis and benchmarking. The organization’s production demand prohibits any significant investment in other activities – including continuous improvement initiatives. The workforce is fully devoted to maintaining status-quo production.

Appendix A

An elector whose name is on the inactive list of electors may vote

If the elector has not changed residences, at the polling place of such elector's last address upon affirming in writing that such elector still resides at the address shown on such elector's registration records.

If the elector has moved to an address within the county in the same precinct, such elector may vote at the polling place of such elector's last address upon affirming in writing that such elector resides in the county by completing a change of address card affirming the new address within the county; or

If the elector has moved to an address within the county or municipality in a different precinct, such elector may vote at the polling place of such elector's last address, for that election and any runoffs resulting from such election only, upon affirming in writing that such elector still resides in the county or municipality and completing a change of address card affirming the new address within the County or municipality.

If an elector whose name appears on the inactive list of electors appears at the polls and votes as provided under subsection of this Code section, the board of registrars shall transfer the elector's name back tot the official list of electors and shall make any necessary correction in the elector's registration records. In addition to the official list of electors provided to each polling place, there shall also be provided an inactive list of electors.

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

See Attached